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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BORDER CROSSINGS:
LOPEZ, MORRISON AND THE FATE OF CONGRESSIONAL
POWER TO REGULATE GOODS, AND TRANSACTIONS
CONNECTED WITH THEM, BASED ON PRIOR PASSAGE
THROUGH INTERSTATE COMMERCE
GORDON G. YOUNG*
INTRODUCTION
From our Constitutional beginnings to the present day, it has
been recognized that the federal government is one of limited, enu-
merated powers, while only the states possess general police powers.1
This means that any federal statute must, in some reasonably convinc-
ing way, trace its authority to a grant of power listed in the Constitu-
tion.2 Between 1937 and 1995, however, this limit was honored
mainly in form.3 During those years, one specific source of federal
Copyright © 2001 by Gordon G. Young.
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1. The Constitution lists, in great detail, powers of the federal legislature in Article 1,
Section 8, suggesting that such powers are limited to those listed. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
ChiefJustice Marshall, in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), stated that
such a limitation was a premise of the Constitution:
This government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers.
The principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted to it, would seem too
apparent, to have required to be enforced by all those arguments, which its en-
lightened friends, while it was depending before the people, found it necessary to
urge; that principle is now universally admitted. But the question respecting the
extent of the powers actually granted, is perpetually arising, and will probably
continue to arise, so long as our system shall exist.
Id. at 405; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) (stating that the author-
ity of Congress "is limited to those powers enumerated in the Constitution . . ."); THE
FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that the
powers of the federal government are "few and defined," those of the states "numerous
and indefinite").
2. The requirement is no more than that it be reasonably implied from specific grants
of power. In this respect McCulloch is the foundational case holding that the structure of
the Constitution and its Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, demon-
strate that Congress must have those subsidiary powers plainly adapted to exercising the
powers that are listed. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
3. For cases vastly expanding Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause during
this era, see Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (holding that Congress acted
within its power under the Commerce Clause when it extended coverage of Title II to
include restaurants serving food that had moved in interstate commerce); Wickard v. Fil-
burn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that Congress may regulate even trivial contributions to
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legislative powers, the Interstate Commerce Clause (the Commerce
Clause),' was read so broadly by the Supreme Court as to provide the
near equivalent of general federal police powers.5 In 1995, in United
States v. Lopez,6 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990 (the Gun Law). 7 A five-justice majority
of the Court, already active in protecting states' rights in other ways,
thus began paring back Congress's powers to regulate the conduct of
private parties under the Commerce Clause.' Five years later, in
United States v. Morrison,9 the Court invalidated provisions of the Vio-
the wheat market if that contribution in combination with others has a nontrivial effect on
commerce); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (holding that the Interstate Com-
merce Clause authorizes Congress to exclude anything of its choosing from such com-
merce as long as no other constitutional limits are violated).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Under this provision, Congress has the power to regu-
late "commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
tribes." The second, italicized portion is the Interstate Commerce Clause. The first and
third portions are referred to as the Foreign and Indian Commerce Clauses respectively.
5. See I LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-4, at 816 (3d ed.
2000). As Professor Tribe has summarized:
The Court's application of its substantial effect and aggregation principles in the
period between 1937 and 1995, combined with its deference to congressional
findings, placed it in the increasingly untenable position of claiming the power to
strike down invocations of the Commerce Clause, while at the same time applying
a set of doctrines that made it virtually impossible actually to exercise this power.
... While all of these precepts were operating at full tilt, striking down a congres-
sional attempt to invoke the commerce power as outside the affirmative scope of
that power was a defacto impossibility.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 190 (1997) (stat-
ing that under the tests that the Court used between 1937 and 1995, "it is difficult to
imagine anything that Congress could not regulate under the commerce clause so long as
it was not violating another constitutional provision").
The case law supports these conclusions. From 1936 until Lopez in 1995, the Supreme
Court struck down no law on the ground that it exceeded Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause. Id. at 190, 194.
6. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
7. Id. at 567-68; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2) (A) (1990) (criminalizing possession of
firearms near or on school property).
8. The majority opinion in Lopez was written by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and joined by
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 550. Previously, in
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), those same five justices, joined by Justice
Souter, had invalidated federal regulation of states that required states to either enact laws
having content specified by Congress or to assume large monetary liabilities. Id. at 180.
That decision was based primarily on a concern for states' rights. See id. The Court's re-
newed interest in protecting states' rights becomes clear when New York is compared with
an earlier case, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 556-57
(1985) (concluding that, with rare exceptions, the Court should not invalidate federal leg-
islation, otherwise within congressional power, simply because states are the objects of reg-
ulation; and finding states' representation in the national political process usually a
sufficient protection of their interests).
9. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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lence Against Women Act"° on the basis of similar reasoning."1 In
Morrison, the same five-justice majority reiterated and somewhat clari-
fied Lopez.' 2
Part I, below, provides a brief survey of Lopez and Morrison. It
explores how the majority opinion in Morrison reaffirms and clarifies
Lopez, while leaving some of the latter's ambiguities untouched.
Part II, below, is the focus of this Article. It explores a variety of
Commerce Clause regulation for which Lopez and Morrison have strong
implications, but which they addressed only indirectly. That variety is
federal regulation of goods, and of transactions involving them, solely
on the ground that the goods once crossed states lines. While Lopez
and Morrison contain holdings as to the power of Congress to regulate
activities based solely on their effects on interstate commerce,' 3 in
dicta both recognize that regulation may be authorized under the
Commerce Clause on grounds other than effect.1 4 Many earlier Su-
preme Court cases recognize such alternative grounds."5 Below, I ar-
gue that the recent Supreme Court cases ultimately are incompatible
with broad congressional power to regulate events solely on the
grounds of interstate border crossings preceding those events. Some
recognition of this incompatibility is already appearing in decisions of
lower federal courts. 1 6
10. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994) (creating a federal civil action for victims of federal and
state violent crimes motivated by the victim's gender).
11. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602, 613.
12. Id. at 609-13. "Since Lopez most recently canvassed and clarified our case law gov-
erning this third category of Commerce Clause regulation, it provides the proper frame-
work for conducting the required analysis of § 13981." Id at 609. Morrison somewhat
clarified Lopez by making clear that certain noneconomic activities are almost certainly
beyond Congress's regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause even if Congress
presents comprehensive and cogent findings that the matters regulated substantially affect
interstate commerce. See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text (discussing Morrison).
13. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613-15 (invalidating provisions of the Violence Against Wo-
men Act as beyond Congress's power over interstate commerce); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567
(holding that Congress's powers to regulate interstate commerce do not extend to
noneconomic activities that do not substantially affect commerce).
14. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-09; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (holding that the Commerce
Clause authorizes Congress to exclude anything of its choosing from such commerce with-
out respect to any level of effect on interstate commerce and as long as no other constitu-
tional limits are violated).
16. As this Article went to press, a Federal District Court narrowly construed a federal
law regulating the interstate shipment, possession, and use of firearms by felons not to
apply to cases in which the sole connection with interstate commerce was prior interstate
shipment. United States v. Coward, 151 F. Supp. 2d 544, 554 (E.D. Pa. 2001). It so con-
strued the law in order to avoid what it saw as the serious likelihood that a law supported
solely by such a connection would exceed Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause.
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Below, I argue that, ultimately, the appropriate ground for regu-
lation of an activity under the Commerce Clause must be its effect on
interstate commerce; although, it is possible that congressional prohi-
bition of specified interstate border crossings, without regard to ef-
fect, is also legitimate. What is not permissible, although it finds some
support in the case law, is the use of a past, nonprohibited border
crossing to justify future regulation of the materials that crossed along
with transactions involving those materials. Some United States Court
of Appeals cases, and arguably some United States Supreme Court
cases, have allowed federal criminalization of possession of a firearm
by a felon on the ground that the weapon previously moved between
states." If federal law follows materials transported across state lines,
like bubble gum stuck to a shoe, then there is little in modern Ameri-
can life that Congress cannot regulate, including events having no fu-
ture effect on interstate commerce. Such regulation simply is not
intelligible as a regulation of interstate commerce.
I. THE MORRISON AND LOPEZ CASES
In Lopez, the Supreme Court, for the first time in nearly sixty
years, found that a federal statute regulating private activity exceeded
Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause.18 The provision of
the Gun Law that the Court struck down in 1995 prohibited the pos-
session of a firearm on the premises or within one thousand feet of
any school.1 9 Five years later in Morrison, the Court invalidated the
Violence Against Women Act,2" which provided federal civil remedies
against those who commit crimes of violence (whether defined by fed-
eral or by state criminal law) when those crimes were motivated, at
least in part, by the gender of the victim.21 The United States de-
fended the constitutionality of each of these statutes using ajustifica-
tion for regulation under the Commerce Clause that the Court had
Id. For a fuller discussion of Coward and the similarities and differences between that
court's analysis and the position taken in this Article, see infra note 157.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Sorrentino, 72 F.3d 294, 296-97 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding
that a weapon's previous border crossing is enough to justify federal regulation of its pos-
session under the Commerce Clause); see also infra note 86 (describing post-Sorrentino cases
taking the same position).
18. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68 (holding that certain provisions of the Gun Law exceeded
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1990).
20. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
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previously recognized.22 More particularly, the argument was that
each was a regulation of activities that affected interstate commerce
sufficiently to warrant federal legislation. 23 The Violence Against Wo-
men Act, but not the Gun Law, was accompanied by voluminous con-
gressional findings supporting a conclusion that violence against
women substantially affected interstate commerce. 24
In the process of holding the Gun Law unconstitutional, the Lopez
majority narrowed the scope of Congress's powers to regulate activi-
ties based on their effect on interstate commerce-one of several ways
regulation can be justified under the Commerce Clause. 21 Most
clearly, it rejected the possibility, arguably suggested by some previous
Supreme Court opinions, that an activity which affects commerce can
be regulated as a result of that effect alone, even though the effect is
less than substantial.26  Lopez clarified requirements for regulation
under the effects test by leaving no doubt that a regulated set of activi-
ties must, in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in
order to justify federal regulation under that test.27 In this respect,
the majority opinion in Morrison can be read only as a continuing en-
dorsement of Lopez. 28
In other ways, however, the Lopez majority unsettled Commerce
Clause jurisprudence under the effects test by apparently deciding
that there exists a class of "noneconomic" (also referred to as "non-
commercial") activities whose regulation under the effects test either:
(1) cannot be justified at all or (2) requires greater justification than
that required for activities which the Court would classify as economic
or commercial. 29 Does Lopez reject regulation of noneconomic activi-
22. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563; see also Brief for the United States
at *9-17, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (No. 93-1260), available at 1993 U.S.
Briefs 1260 (LEXIS).
23. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563; see also Brief for the United States
at *9-10, Lopez (No. 93-1260).
24. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 ("In contrast with the lack of congressional findings that
we faced in Lopez, § 13981 is supported by numerous findings regarding the serious impact
that gender-motivated violence has on victims and their families."); see also Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 562-63 (indicating the lack of congressional findings).
25. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565-66.
26. Id. at 559 ("Within this final category, admittedly, our case law has not been clear
whether an activity must 'affect' or 'substantially affect' interstate commerce in order to be
within Congress' power to regulate it under the Commerce Clause.").
27. Id. ("We conclude, consistent with the great weight of our case law, that the proper
test requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity 'substantially affects' interstate
commerce.").
28. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-09 (endorsing the Lopez framework).
29. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62.
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ties altogether or does it merely require greater proof of their effect
on commerce?
Some statements in Lopez suggest that the defects in the Gun Law
might have been cured by Congressional findings persuasively demon-
strating the substantial aggregate effect on interstate commerce of the
many individual instances of gun possession near schools."0 On this
view, the significance of the economic versus noneconomic distinction
is presumptive, not conclusive. If some activity seems noneconomic
on the surface (or as Lapez says, "to the naked eye"), then the burden
is on the federal government to establish a substantial effect on inter-
state commerce by very persuasive evidence: "But to the extent that
congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judg-
ment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate com-
merce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked
eye, they are lacking here.
3 1
Other passages from the Lopez opinion suggest that some activi-
ties, including the activity regulated by the Gun Law, are categorically
noneconomic, and thus no set of Congressional findings could vali-
date their regulation under the Commerce Clause's substantial effects
test:
The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense
an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere,
substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce. Respon-
dent was a local student at a local school; there is no indica-
tion that he had recently moved in interstate commerce, and
there is no requirement that his possession of the firearm
have any concrete tie to interstate commerce.3 2
Read literally, this is not an evidentiary proposition that a case has not
been made, but rather a substantive one that a case could not be
made based on effects, no matter how strong the evidence. On this
view, the substantial effects of noneconomic activity on interstate com-
30. Id. at 562. In the words of the Court:
Although as part of our independent evaluation of constitutionality under the
Commerce Clause we of course consider legislative findings, and indeed even
congressional committee findings, regarding effect on interstate commerce, the
Government concedes that "[ n ] either the statute nor its legislative history contain
express congressional findings regarding the effects upon interstate commerce of
gun possession in a school zone." We agree with the Government that Congress
normally is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens
that an activity has on interstate commerce.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
31. Id. at 563 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 567 (emphasis added).
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merce can never justify federal regulation. In its apparently categori-
cal exclusion of certain activities from Commerce Clause regulation,
the Lopez Court takes a position resembling one taken by the pre-New
Deal Court and strongly repudiated by subsequent Supreme Courts. 3
The majority opinion in Morrison does not quite resolve whether
protection for noneconomic activities from regulation under the ef-
fects test is absolute, but it comes close to doing so." At a minimum,
the opinion suggests that the burden on a supporter of such regula-
tion will be large:
Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of
the phrase, economic activity. While we need not adopt a cate-
gorical rule against aggregating the effects of any
noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in
our Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce
Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity
is economic in nature.
Perhaps announcement of a categorical rule is just postponed for
another day, but, according to the Morrison majority, everything the
Court has done so far is consistent with such a rule.36 In other
passages, the Court acknowledges that congressional findings, of the
sort missing from Lopez, were amply present to support the Violence
Against Women Act.3 But it turns out that while the absence of find-
ings was fatal in Lopez, their presence is not constitutionally sufficient
to validate regulation of noneconomic activities." In short, even per-
suasive findings did not validate the Violence Against Women Act and
would not have saved the Gun Law. The Court takes this position, not
33. This was the position that certain productive activities, such as mining and manu-
facturing, are per se local and cannot be federally regulated no matter the magnitude of
their effects on interstate commerce. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1,
12 (1895). As the Court explained:
Doubtless the power to control the manufacture of a given thing involves in a
certain sense the control of its disposition, but this is a secondary and not the
primary sense; and although the exercise of that power may result in bringing the
operation of commerce into play, it does not control it, and affects it only inci-
dentally and indirectly. Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of
it.
Id. While Lopez would allow much of the regulation forbidden in Knight, its own apparent
categorical exclusion from regulation under the Commerce Clause is for noneconomic
activities. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
34. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 614.
38. Id. ("[T]he existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain
the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation.").
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because of its view that Congress was wrong about such effects, but
rather because such effects have no constitutional significance."9
Why? Because allowing such effects to determine Congress's power
would unbalance constitutional federalism, as the majority sees it, by
leaving nothing significant outside of federal legislative power:
[T]he concern . . . expressed in Lopez that Congress might
use the Commerce Clause to completely obliterate the Con-
stitution's distinction between national and local authority
seems well founded. The reasoning that petitioners advance
seeks to follow the but-for causal chain ... to every attenu-
ated effect upon interstate commerce .... [Their] reason-
ing would allow Congress to regulate any crime as long as
[its] nationwide, aggregated impact . ..has substantial ef-
fects on employment, production, transit, or consumption.
[Their] reasoning ... will not limit Congress to regulat-
ing violence but may... be applied equally.., to family law
and other areas of traditional state regulation since the ag-
gregate effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the
national economy is undoubtedly significant.40
Certainly this partial passage might be read both as rejecting only
the method (of summing a set of "attenuated" effects) employed by
Congress, and as consistent with the Court's claim that it has not yet
resolved whether noneconomic activity is categorically beyond regula-
tion under the effects test. The remainder of the passage, however,
strongly suggests a looming categorical rejection of regulation of
noneconomic activity under the effects test: "We accordingly reject
the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent crimi-
nal conduct based solely on the conduct's aggregate effect on inter-
state commerce."41 There can be little doubt of the current majority's
belief in a categorical rule.4 2
39. See id. (stating that the decision as to whether Congress may constitutionally regu-
late an activity under the Commerce Clause is ajudicial question, not a legislative one).
40. Id. at 615-16 (internal citation omitted).
41. Id. at 617.
42. See id. at 608-09, 617 (describing the three categories of conduct that Congress may
regulate under the Commerce Clause and upholding the Violence Against Women Act
under the third category-affecting interstate commerce).
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II. REGULATING GOODS AND TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING THEM ON
GROUNDS THAT THEY ONCE CROSSED STATE LINES
A. Commerce Clause Regulatory Justifications Other than the
Substantial Effects Test
Both Lopez and Morrison recognize that the effect of activities on
interstate commerce is not the only justification for regulation under
the Commerce Clause:
[W]e have identified three broad categories of activity that
Congress may regulate under its commerce power. First,
Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or per-
sons or things in interstate commerce, even though the
threat may come only from intrastate activities. Finally, Con-
gress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate
those activities having a substantial relation to interstate com-
merce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect inter-
state commerce.43
While some statements in these cases suggest that regulation of chan-
nels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce and persons and
things in such commerce are dependent on an effects test, it seems
more probable that the Court currently sees these three justifications
as mutually independent. 4
4
Beyond this, the Court, before Lopez, had recognized a justifica-
tion for regulation that may or may not fit comfortably within the
three mentioned in the Lopez-Morrison description of Commerce
Clause powers. This is regulation of goods and of transactions con-
nected with them after the goods have crossed an interstate border
solely on grounds that they once crossed. Some post-Lopez United
States Court of Appeals cases, and arguably some pre-Lopez United
States Supreme Court cases, have allowed federal criminalization of
possession of a firearm by a felon on the ground that it previously
moved between states.45
43. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (internal citations omitted); see
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-09 (quoting, with approval, large portions of this passage from
Lopez).
44. This view is consistent with the Court's use of the word "categories" to describe the
justifications for congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause. See Morrison, 529
U.S. at 608; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
45. See, e.g., Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 566-67 (1977); United States v.
Sorrentino, 72 F.3d 294, 296-97 (2d Cir. 1995).
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Remotely this sort of regulation fits within the first justification
recognized by Lopez and Morrison-regulation of "the channels of in-
terstate commerce."46 However, only with great liberality can such
regulation be viewed as regulation of commerce, regulation to protect
it, or even regulation of its channels. Immediately below, I examine the
origins of the justification for regulation of activities connected with a
border crossing solely on grounds of the previous crossing. Later, I
offer criticism.
B. History of Border Crossing Justifications for Regulation
The Court's cases defining Congress's powers over interstate
commerce recognize justifications for regulation that, I believe, can
be most usefully sorted into two main categories. The first are regula-
tions based on Congress's power to control and facilitate reasonably
identifiable border crossings.47 The second are regulations based on
the regulated activity's effect on interstate commerce.4" These catego-
ries are obviously not entirely distinct. Anything that affects com-
merce ultimately affects future border crossings; although, as we will
see, the converse is not always true: regulation of something based on
the fact that it once crossed a border is no guarantee of any particular
future effect on such commerce.49
These imperfectly distinct types of regulation developed precisely
because the Supreme Court, during the period from the late nine-
teenth century to 1935, wished to allow states some enclaves of sover-
46. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. The argument would be that such
regulation is a regulation of the channels of interstate commerce, the first regulatory tech-
nique recognized by Lopez. 514 U.S. at 558-59. The more specific argument for this only
remotely plausible way of harmonizing Lopez with recognition of the validity of regulating
based on a past border crossing would be that, in such regulation, Congress chooses to
allow things to pass through the channels of interstate commerce on condition that they
are regulated by federal law after they cross. I reject this justification below. See infra notes
136-151 and accompanying text.
47. See Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 566-67 (upholding a federal law criminalizing a felon's
possession of a firearm that had previously crossed state lines arguably based on the fire-
arm's prior movement in interstate commerce); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304-
05 (1964) (upholding a federal law prohibiting racial discrimination by restaurants argua-
bly based on the fact that the food they served had previously crossed state lines).
48. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (invalidating provisions of the Violence Against Wo-
men Act as beyond Congress's power over interstate commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (upholding congressional regulation of wheat production because of
the effect such production has on interstate commerce); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41-43 (1937) (upholding Congress's power to regulate labor relations in
industries where work stoppages would have a serious effect on interstate commerce).
49. See infra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
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eignty in which they alone could regulate private conduct.50 Thus,
despite some earlier cases to the contrary, the Court, during this pe-
riod, concluded that the effect of certain activities on interstate com-
merce alone, no matter how substantial, would not by itself warrant
federal regulation of activities that were characterized as per se lo-
cal. 51 These insulated activities included basic productive activities
such as mining, farming, and manufacture. 52 The most dramatic ex-
ample of the ensuing impotence in the face of national economic
problems was the Court's conclusion that the activities of the sugar
trust could not be regulated despite its control of over ninety percent
of the United States sugar production 5' and thus its powerful effect on
interstate commerce.54
What did suffice to justify regulation at the time was that the mat-
ter regulated pertained more directly (or perhaps more identifiably)
to a state border crossing. 5 The creation of such power was, after all,
a main impetus for and object of the efforts to create a constitution
supplanting the ineffective Articles of Confederation.56
50. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11 (1895) (discussing the
difference between the states' general police power and Congress's power to regulate in-
terstate commerce).
51. Id at 17 (holding that an attempt to monopolize had only an indirect effect on
commerce and thus was not subject to regulation by Congress). The Knight majority
quoted from an earlier case:
If it be held that the term includes the regulation of all such manufactures as are
intended to be the subject of commercial transactions in the future, it is impossi-
ble to deny that it would also include all productive industries that contemplate
the same thing. The result would be that Congress would be invested, to the
exclusion of the States, with the power to regulate, not only manufactures, but
also agriculture, horticulture, stock raising, domestic fisheries, mining-in short,
every branch of human industry .... A situation more paralyzing to the state
governments, and more provocative of conflicts between the general government
and the States, and less likely to have been what the framers of the Constitution
intended, it would be difficult to imagine.
Id. at 14-15 (quoting Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1888)).
52. Id. at 14.
53. See id. at 9 ("By the purchase of the stock of the four Philadelphia refineries, with
shares of its own stock, the American Sugar Refining Company acquired nearly complete
control of the manufacture of refined sugar within the United States.").
54. Id, at 17.
55. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. Because borders were infinitely thin
and articles of commerce generally are "on" borders for a very short time, it is inconceiv-
able that Congress's commerce power was intended to apply only to events occurring on
borders.
56. Justice Rutledge's extra-judicial writings provide an especially clear statement of
the centrality of the Commerce Clause, and the concerns prompting it, to the framing of
the Constitution:
If any liberties may be held more basic than others, they are the great and
indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment. But it was
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As a result, what was intelligible as a regulation of commerce was
limited. First, it was possible for Congress to prohibit specified things
from crossing state lines and to punish those responsible for prohib-
ited movement.57 Second, it was possible to facilitate border crossings
by protecting the regular channels (the most concrete examples of
which were railroad tracks) and instrumentalities (the most concrete
example of which were railroad cars) of interstate commerce.5"
not to assure them that the Constitution was framed and adopted. Only later
were they added, by popular demand. It was rather to secure freedom of trade, to
break down the barriers to its free flow, that the Annapolis Convention was called,
only to adjourn with a view to Philadelphia. Thus the generating source of the
Constitution lay in the rising volume of restraints upon commerce which the Con-
federation could not check. These were the proximate cause of our national exis-
tence down to today.
As evils are wont to do, they dictated the character and scope of their own
remedy. This lay specifically in the commerce clause. No prohibition of trade
barriers as among the states could have been effective of its own force or by trade
agreements. It had become apparent that such treaties were too difficult to nego-
tiate and the process of securing them was too complex for this method to give
the needed relief. Power adequate to make and enforce the prohibition was re-
quired. Hence, the necessity for creating an entirely new scheme of government.
. . . So by a stroke as bold as it proved successful, they founded a nation,
although they had set out only to find a way to reduce trade restrictions. So also
they solved the particular problem causative of their historic action, by introduc-
ing the commerce clause in the new structure of power.
WILEY RUTLEDGE, A DECLARATION OF LEGAL FAITH 25-26 (1947) (footnote omitted).
57. For a broad statement from early last century describing this prohibition tech-
nique, see Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 323 (1913) (upholding, as within Congress's
powers over interstate commerce, a prohibition on the transportation of women between
states for "immoral purposes"). In Hoke the Court stated:
The principle established by the cases is the simple one, when rid of confusing
and distracting considerations, that Congress has power over transportation
.among the several States"; that the power is complete in itself, and that Congress,
as an incident to it, may adopt not only means necessary but convenient to its
exercise, and the means may have the quality of police regulations. We have no
hesitation, therefore, in pronouncing the act... a legal exercise of the power of
Congress.
Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 57-58
(1911) (upholding, as within Congress's powers over interstate commerce, a prohibition of
specified mislabeled foodstuffs); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 363 (1903) (upholding,
as within Congress's powers over interstate commerce, a prohibition on the transportation
of lottery tickets between states).
In some cases before 1936, however, the Court took a narrower view of Congress's
powers. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) (holding unconstitu-
tional an act of Congress prohibiting the transportation of goods made by children under
a certain age or who worked more than a specified number of hours per week).
58. See S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 27 (1911) (permitting congressional
regulation, under the Commerce Clause, of intrastate rail car coupling devices to lessen
accidents that threatened interstate use of the same track); cf McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 417 (1819) (inferring from the explicitly granted power of Congress
188
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Third, less concrete analogs to these became recognized: some busi-
nesses, such as stock yards that regularly moved material in interstate
commerce, were described as part of currents of commerce.59 Thus,
they resembled railroad tracks, cars, and stations that, while predomi-
nately located off state border lines, were regularly instrumental in
achieving border crossings.
These possibilities turned into accepted rationales as they devel-
oped into what the Court has termed the "current of commerce" and
"prohibition" rationales for federal regulation. In its strongest form,
as embraced by Justice Holmes and apparently later by a majority of
the Court, the prohibition technique recognizes congressional power
under the Commerce Clause to stop the movement of anything across
a border, unless the prohibition violates some specific right, such as
those rooted in "equal protection" or the First Amendment.6' On this
"to establish post-offices and post-roads," U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 7, the power to punish
those who "rob" the mails).
59. Swift & Co. v. United States, 195 U.S. 375, 398-99 (1905). In a famous passage
Justice Holmes explained:
When cattle are sent for sale from a place in one State, with the expectation that
they will end their transit, after purchase, in another, and when in effect they do
so, with only the interruption necessary to find a purchaser at the stock yards, and
when this is a typical, constantly recurring course, the current thus existing is a
current of commerce among the States, and the purchase of the cattle is a part
and incident of such commerce.
I.
60. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941). In Darby, the Court explained:
The power of Congress over interstate commerce "is complete in itself, may be
exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are
prescribed in the Constitution." That power can neither be enlarged nor dimin-
ished by the exercise or non-exercise of state power. Congress, following its own
conception of public policy concerning the restrictions which may appropriately
be imposed on interstate commerce, is free to exclude from the commerce arti-
cles whose use in the states for which they are destined it may conceive to be
injurious to the public health, morals or welfare, even though the state has not
sought to regulate their use.
Id. at 114 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196
(1824)).
Holmes's earlier espousal of this position came in a dissent. In his dissent in Hammer
v. Dagenhart, Justice Holmes wrote:
The statute confines itself to prohibiting the carriage of certain goods in inter-
state or foreign commerce. Congress is given the power to regulate such com-
merce in unqualified terms.... Regulation means the prohibition of something,
and when interstate commerce is the matter to be regulated I cannot doubt that
the regulation may prohibit any part of such commerce that Congress sees fit to
forbid.
247 U.S. at 277-78 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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view, Congress could stop the movement of almost any thing or any
class of things if it had some thin rational basis for doing so.61
Once Franklin Roosevelt had appointed a sufficient number of
Justices who rejected a narrow view of Congress's powers, it once
again became possible for Congress to regulate an activity based on its
significant effects on interstate commerce.62 After the New Deal, that
technique proved so extraordinarily potent that it seemed to provide
police power to the federal government without practical limits.63
Still, the other techniques of commerce regulation involving border
crossings, and particularly the technique of prohibition of movement,
persisted and grew alongside an invigorated effects test. In United
States v. Darby, the Court seemed to return to the view of earlier Courts
that Congress possesses plenary power to prohibit the movement of
goods across state lines:
Congress, following its own conception of public policy con-
cerning the restrictions which may appropriately be imposed
on interstate commerce, is free to exclude from the com-
merce articles whose use in the states for which they are des-
tined it may conceive to be injurious to the public health,
morals or welfare, even though the state has not sought to
regulate their use.
Such regulation is not a forbidden invasion of state
power merely because either its motive or its consequence is
to restrict the use of articles of commerce within the states of
61. Since approximately 1938, see United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938), the Supreme Court has generally conducted probing judicial review (in-
cluding strict and intermediate scrutiny) only in cases involving governmental interference
with some fundamental right, such as freedom of speech, or involving a governmental
classification based on fully or partially suspect classifications such as race or gender. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 414-17 (discussing the levels of scrutiny courts apply in evalu-
ating constitutional claims). In all other cases, at least officially, the Court has applied a
rational basis test that almost never results in the invalidation of governmental action. See
id. at 415 (discussing the rational basis test, and observing that "only rarely has the Su-
preme Court invalidated laws as failing rational basis review").
62. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (upholding, as within Con-
gress's interstate commerce powers, an act regulating small amounts of crop production
for consumption on a small farm on the theory that it, along with similar production on
other farms in the aggregate, had a substantial effect on interstate commerce). By the time
Wickard was decided, President Roosevelt had succeeded in changing the composition of
the Supreme Court so that a strong majority of the Justices recognized federal regulatory
powers that were more expansive than the Court was willing to recognize less than a dec-
ade before. GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 183-85
(13th ed. 1997); see also id. at 185 n.10 (describing President Roosevelt's seven appoint-
ments to the Court from 1937 to 1941).
63. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's tendency to uphold
federal regulations under the Commerce Clause).
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destination; and is not prohibited unless by other Constitu-
tional provisions. It is no objection to the assertion of the
power to regulate interstate commerce that its exercise is at-
tended by the same incidents which attend the exercise of
the police power of the states.6 4
While in at least some doubt as to its scope after Lopez and Morri-
son, Congress's power to prohibit the movement of things in interstate
commerce is historically interesting because it reflects a particular
view of what (at least at a minimum) a regulation of commerce is. It is
a view that seems to go back to the John Marshall Court. In an early
opinion, ChiefJustice Marshall suggested that if something were a reg-
ulation of interstate commerce it was per se valid or at least unreview-
able by the Court.65 In asking what is the power to regulate
commerce, he concluded:
It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by
which commerce is to be governed. This power ... is com-
plete in itself. . . and acknowledges no limitations, other
than are prescribed in the constitution .... If, as has always
been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though lim-
ited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the
power over commerce ... among the several States, is vested
in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single govern-
ment .... The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their iden-
tity with the people, and the influence which their constituents
possess . . . are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for
example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have
relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on
which the people must often rely solely, in all representative
governments.
66
On the surface it may seem strange that Marshall wrote the above
passages, abjuring judicial review of regulation of commerce, while at
the same time concluding that the Court did have a role in assuring
the constitutionality of any federal regulation that attempted to base
itself on the Commerce Clause:
6 7
Should congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt mea-
sures which are prohibited by the constitution; or should
congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws
for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the gov-
64. Darby, 312 U.S. at 114 (internal citations omitted).
65. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196-97.
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819).
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ernment; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal,
should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to
say, that such an act was not the law of the land.6"
The most plausible way of harmonizing these apparently discor-
dant passages is to conclude that Marshall believed that only some
questions were appropriate for the Court. It is most likely he believed
that the Court had the "painful duty" to determine only whether the
activity a particular statute regulated was interstate commerce but should
not decide whether any particular regulation of commerce was within
regulatory powers as contemplated by the Commerce Clause.69 In
short, if the activity regulated was commerce, then the regulation was
per se valid under the Commerce Clause, or at least unreviewable,
unless it offended one of the very few individual rights then guaran-
teed under the Constitution.7" This was true whether the regulation
imposed certain requirements on or completely prohibited such com-
merce. This is a natural reading of "the sovereignty of Congress,
though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects
"71
I believe that it is this view-coupled with the view that if any-
thing is commerce an interstate border crossing certainly is-which
led Justice Holmes, and then later the entire Court, to endorse the
broadest view of Congress's powers to prohibit the movement of
things in interstate commerce:
Congress, following its own conception of public policy con-
cerning the restrictions which may appropriately be imposed
on interstate commerce, is free to exclude from the com-
merce articles whose use in the states for which they are des-
tined it may conceive to be injurious to the public health,
morals or welfare, even though the state has not sought to
regulate their use.7 2
This broad view thus seems based on one historical position as to
what interstate commerce is. Or perhaps it is a position on what such
regulation is at a minimum, leaving room for other kinds of regulation
based on "effect" and thus indirectly on border crossings. The view
68. Id.
69. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196-97.
70. See id.
71. Id. at 197.
72. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941); see also Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251, 277-78 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("Regulation means the prohibition of
something, and when interstate commerce is the matter to be regulated I cannot doubt
that the regulation may prohibit any part of such commerce that Congress sees fit to
forbid.").
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that control of border crossings is part of the commerce power is eas-
ily harmonized with Lopez's language recognizing power to regulate
the channels of interstate commerce, arguably without a separate
showing that the activity regulated substantially affects interstate
commerce.
73
The holdings of Lopez and Morrison somewhat limited Congress's
power to regulate activities based on their effect on interstate com-
merce, which is just one of several justifications that the Court recog-
nizes for regulation under the Commerce Clause.7 ' However, the
spirit of those cases seems to sweep more broadly, possibly presaging
limits on other techniques that have been used to justify regulation
under the Commerce Clause. For example, the vision of Lopez and
Morrison might lead to a narrowing of Congress's powers to prohibit
movement in interstate commerce or to regulate goods and transac-
tions involving them, based on the prior movement of the goods in
interstate commerce. The prohibition technique is not the most
problematical, for it is generally an unwieldy way of evading the spirit
of Lopez's new attempt to protect states from federal regulation of
noneconomic activity or economic activity not substantially affecting
interstate commerce. Prohibition-style regulation comes at the price
of stopping the movement of certain goods, a price that Congress
often will be unwilling to pay.
However, a second, quite different regulatory technique, also
based on border crossings, does raise substantial possibilities for eva-
sion of Lopez. It also does not fit as comfortably within the meaning of
"regulation of interstate commerce" as do congressional powers to
prohibit movement across borders. This is the technique of regulat-
ing transactions based on their connections with goods that have pre-
viously moved in interstate commerce. For example, in Katzenbach v.
McClung,75 the Court allowed Congress to regulate provisions of ser-
vice by a restaurant arguably based solely on the restaurant's use of
food that had previously crossed a border.76 It is inconceivable that
Congress would prohibit the movement of food across state lines. Al-
lowing federal regulatory power to sweep into states along with the
movement of goods offers, at its broadest, a breathtaking increase in
the power of the federal government that seems incompatible not
73. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (stating "Congress may regulate
the use of the channels of interstate commerce").
74. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
75. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
76. Id. at 304.
2002]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
only with the Lopez-Morrison view of federalism 77 but also with any rea-
sonable view. More formalistically, such regulatory power seems
outside the ordinary language bounds of the words "regulation of
commerce." Consequently, immediately below I focus on the proba-
ble fate, after the recent Supreme Court cases, of the technique argua-
bly in play in McClung.
C. Regulation of the Future Life of Goods on the Grounds That They
Once Crossed a Border
1. Cases and Arguments in Support of Broad Congressional Power:
Scarborough v. United States and United States v. Sorrentino: Their
Support for the Broad Reading of Congress's Powers to Use the Border-Crossing
Technique.-There are Supreme Court cases suggesting that the move-
ment of goods across a state border justifies substantial federal regula-
tion of the future circumstances and use of such goods, even without a
showing that the goods continue to affect interstate commerce.
In Scarborough v. United States,78 the Court considered the validity,
under the Commerce Clause, of a federal law79 that made it a crime
for a felon to possess a firearm that had once moved in interstate com-
merce.8 ° On the surface, the majority in Scarborough found the federal
law was supported by the commerce power solely on the basis of the
jurisdictional element-the firearm's prior movement in interstate
commerce.8' The issue seems squarely framed and resolved in Scarbor-
ough, for it upheld the conviction of a defendant who possessed fire-
arms that had previously crossed state lines after the Court had
granted certiorari limited to the following question:
Whether the Court erred in holding that a conviction under
18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a) for possession of a firearm in com-
merce or affecting commerce by a convicted felon is sustain-
able merely upon a showing that the possessed firearm has
previously at any time however remote traveled in interstate
Commerce. 8 2
77. See supra note 8 (describing the Lopez-Morrison majority's renewed interest in pro-
tecting states' rights).
78. 431 U.S. 563 (1977).
79. The Court examined Tide VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968. 18 U.S.C. App. §§ 1201-1203 (1976) (repealed 1986).
80. Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 564.
81. Id. at 566-67 (upholding the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals's decision that a fire-
arm's prior movement in interstate commerce gave the necessary nexus to justify federal
regulation).
82. Id. at 567 n.5 (emphasis added).
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In United States v. Sorrentino," a post-Lopez United States Court of
Appeals case, the court read Scarborough that way, upholding a later
version of the firearm possession law on the basis of a prior border
crossing." In doing so, Sorrentino distinguished Lopez as a case where
lack of commerce was found because neither an affecting commerce
rationale nor a jurisdictional element provided support:
The statute before us avoids the constitutional deficiency
identified in Lopez because it requires a legitimate nexus with
interstate commerce .... In Scarborough... [the Supreme
Court] further concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a), the predecessor
statute to Section 92 2 (g), was a legitimate exercise of Congress's pow-
ers under the Commerce Clause because the Constitution requires
only a "minimal nexus that the firearm have been, at some time, in
interstate commerce."8
5
Other circuits agree that a prior border crossing validates at least
much, if not all, regulation under the Commerce Clause, both in the
context of possession of weapons and in other contexts as well.86 Both
Lopez and Morrison offer some statements that could be seen as sup-
porting the broad view of Congress's powers. Both cases distinguished
the statutes that they invalidated from statutes containing jurisdic-
tional elements:
Like the . . .Act at issue in Lopez, § 13981 [the Violence
Against Women Act] contains no jurisdictional element es-
tablishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of
Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce. Although
Lopez makes clear that such a jurisdictional element would
83. 72 F.3d 294 (2d Cir. 1995).
84. Id. at 296.
85. Id. at 267 (emphasis added) (quoting Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 575).
86. United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 1996):
Today we join all other circuits that have considered the issue post Lopez and hold
that neither the holding in Lopez nor the reasons given therefor [sic] constitution-
ally invalidate § 922(g) (1).
... The "in or affecting commerce" element can be satisfied if the firearm
possessed by a convicted felon had previously traveled in interstate commerce.
Id. The following cases from other circuits follow or precede Scarborough (2d Cir.) and
Rawls (5th Cir.) in upholding, as a valid exercise of Congress's commerce power, 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1)'s prohibition of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon: United States v.
Chesney, 86 F.3d 564, 572 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Gateward, 84 F.3d 670, 672 (3d
Cir. 1996); United States v. Bradford, 78 F.3d 1216, 1223 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Bates, 77 F.3d 1101, 1104 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 390
(11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hinton, No. 95-5095, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 30755, at *5
(4th Cir. Oct. 25, 1995); United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 400 (10th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Collins, 61 F.3d 1379, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1995).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
lend support to the argument that § 13981 is sufficiently tied
to interstate commerce, Congress elected to cast § 13981's
remedy over a wider, and more purely intrastate, body of vio-
lent crime.87
One other Supreme Court case seems to go even further in per-
mitting regulation of activities under the Commerce Clause based
solely on the connection of those activities with an earlier border
crossing. In Katzenbach v. McClung,s 8 the Court found that the Com-
merce Clause supported portions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibiting racial discrimination by certain restaurants.8 " The way the
Court framed the issue in McClung suggests that the use by those res-
taurants of substantial amounts of food that had moved in interstate
commerce was sufficient justification for that regulation: "The sole
question, therefore, narrows down to whether Title II, as applied to a
restaurant annually receiving about $70,000 worth of food which has
moved in commerce, is a valid exercise of the power of Congress." 90
Despite the Court's reasoning in Scarborough and McClung, there
are substantial arguments against congressional power to regulate
what would otherwise be interstate activities based solely on their con-
nection with some earlier crossing of a state line. These begin with a
recognition that Scarborough and McClung may not be what they seem.
2. The Case Against Regulation ofActivities Based Solely on Their Con-
nections with Past Border Crossings.-While Lopez and Morrison note the
lack of jurisdictional elements,91 the Court is never clear about what
these elements are and to what extent the elements mightjustify regu-
lation of an activity despite its lack of a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. Perhaps the statements made by the Court in Morrison
and Lopez were simply acknowledgments that the significance of such
elements was not then before the Court.
Supporting the case against continuing federal power based on
past border crossings alone are: (1) tensions between such justifica-
87. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000); see also United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 561-62 (1995).
88. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
89. Id. at 304 (stating that Congress "had a rational basis for finding that racial discrim-
ination in restaurants had a direct and adverse effect on the free flow of interstate
commerce").
90. Id. at 298.
91. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (stating that the challenged law "contains no jurisdictional
element establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of Congress's power to
regulate interstate commerce"); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (stating that the challenged law
"contains no jurisdictional element which would ensure" that the activity in question "af-
fects interstate commerce").
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tions and the view of federalism driving Lopez and Morrison, and (2)
the difficulty of finding any connection between such a technique and
an intelligible purpose of the Commerce Clause. Before examining
such difficulties, it is worthwhile to determine how much support the
post-crossing technique truly has in precedent. On closer examina-
tion, Scarborough and McClung are much more equivocal than they at
first seem.
a. The Equivocal Nature of Scarborough and McClung.-The
Court's statements in Scarborough indicating that the prior passage of a
weapon across a state border offers a sufficient ground for a federal
law criminalizing its possession by a felon92 are perhaps ultimately de-
pendent on what was then the prevailing view of the affecting com-
merce technique. The Scarborough majority noted that Congress was
not concerned with the movement of weapons across borders, but,
more generally, with the possession of weapons by felons-a state of
affairs that Congress believed affected interstate commerce
negatively.
93
The majority opinion in Scarborough seems unconcerned with
Congress's ability to reach post-crossing possession of weapons by
felons. Instead, the opinion seems premised on Congress's constitu-
tional power to regulate all possession of weapons by felons under the
broad affecting commerce view that then prevailed.94 While never
saying so expressly, the whole opinion seems to limit the crime to
weapons that have crossed state lines, not because the Constitution so
requires, but because Congress itself imposed such a limit in an at-
tempt to avoid what were, most likely at the time, imaginary constitu-
tional difficulties:
In this case, the history is unambiguous and the text consis-
tent with it. Congress sought to reach possessions broadly,
with little concern for when the nexus with commerce oc-
curred. Indeed, it was a close question in [a previous case] whether
92. Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 566-67 (1977) (affirming the Fourth
Circuit's finding that a border crossing was sufficient to satisfy the "nexus requirement" of
interstate commerce).
93. Id. at 572. As the Court explained:
The legislative history in its entirety, while brief, further supports the view that
Congress sought to rule broadly-to keep guns out of the hands of those who
have demonstrated that "they may not be trusted to possess a firearm without
becoming a threat to society." There is simply no indication of any concern with
either the movement of the gun or the possessor or with the time of acquisition.
Id. (quoting 114 CONG. Rsc. 14773 (1968)).
94. See id at 571-72 (discussing Congress's reliance on the affecting commerce ratio-
nale in passing Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968).
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§ 1202(a) even required proof of any nexus at all in individual
cases. The only reason we concluded it did was because it was not
"plainly and unmistakably" clear that it did not. But there is no
question that Congress intended no more than a minimal
nexus requirement.95
Presumably, had there been constitutional doubts about Con-
gress's ability to reach all possession by felons, regardless of a "nexus,"
that would have been a second reason for construing the statute as
requiring a "nexus." Nowhere in Scarborough, however, does the Court
even hint that serious constitutional difficulties would have presented
themselves had Congress eliminated all nexus requirements and re-
lied solely on effect.
This probable premise of the Court-that the greater (a federal
power to forbid all firearm possession by felons) includes the lesser
(the power to do so when the gun has crossed state lines)-worked
well in 1977. At that time the greater power was not in doubt. The
Court was willing to rubber stamp almost any congressional conclu-
sion that a set of activities had a sufficient effect on interstate com-
merce to justify federal regulation.96 Specific findings were not then
necessary to support even very attenuated claims that regulated activi-
ties had sufficient effects on interstate commerce.97 It is very clear
after Lopez and Morrison that the implicit premise of the Scarborough
Court is no longer true.98 Today, under Lopez, federal regulation of
95. Id. at 577 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
96. See 1 TRIBE, supra note 5, at 816 (describing the Court's deference to Congress in
Commerce Clause cases between 1937 and 1995).
97. Id. Professor Tribe describes the Court's deference to Congress between 1937 and
1995 as follows:
Where Congress had provided findings linking the challenged regulation of an
activity to its power to regulate interstate commerce, the Court would defer to
these findings unless they had no "rational basis"; if no findings accompanied the
legislation, the Court demonstrated that it would nevertheless uphold the regula-
tion if it could on its own imagine the articulation of some rational basis for locat-
ing the legislative act within the commerce power or for describing the legislative
act as a necessary and proper means of effectuating that power, and such a ra-
tional basis would exist whenever the requisite effect on interstate commerce
could be thought to result from the aggregation of all instances of an activity, or
of all activities falling into a still broader class of actions. While all of these
precepts were operating at full tilt, striking down a congressional attempt to in-
voke the commerce power as outside the affirmative scope of that power was a de
facto impossibility.
Id.
98. See id. at 819 ("Lopez's discussion of the 'substantial effects' test reveals that, rather
than focusing on the quantity of the regulated activity's effects, the Court was attempting
to reconfigure its precedents to focus more attention on the nature of the underlying activity
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all gun possession without reference to some border crossing would
certainly not be permitted.9" From the perspective of the Lopez major-
ity, Congress does not regulate an economic activity when it regulates
gun possession (as opposed to gun sales). At the time of Scarborough,
however, it is likely that the availability of the affecting commerce
technique powerfully influenced the conclusion of constitutionality,
while the border crossing added only apparent depth to the
reasoning.
The second case offering surface support for an independentjus-
tification based on past crossings, Katzenbach v. McClung,100 turns out
to be similar to Scarborough when viewed under the microscope. Ad-
mittedly, the Court briefly discussed features of the statute it upheld,
which prohibited racial discrimination in restaurants that served food
that had previously crossed borders.1"' However, the Court's analysis
focused entirely on the effect of racial discrimination on interstate
commerce, not the fact that the food had crossed a border:
We noted in Heart of Atlanta Motel that a number of witnesses
attested to the fact that racial discrimination was not merely
a state or regional problem but was one of nationwide scope.
Against this background, we must conclude that while the
focus of the legislation was on the individual restaurant's re-
lation to interstate commerce, Congress appropriately con-
sidered the importance of that connection with the
knowledge that the discrimination was but "representative of many
others throughout the country, the total incidence of which if left un-
checked may well become far-reaching in its harm to commerce."1" 2
This language ultimately rests Commerce Clause justification on the
harm to commerce from discrimination-an effects justification.
While the Court occasionally weaves the nexus requirement into its
99. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995). In Lopez the Court stated:
The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that
might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate com-
merce. Respondent was a local student at a local school; there is no indication
that he had recently moved in interstate commerce, and there is no requirement
that his possession of the firearm have any concrete tie to interstate commerce.
Id. (emphasis added). Of course if a statute regulating gun possession in school zones
exceeds Congress's commerce powers, then a fortiori, one which extended to the entire
United States would as well.
100. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
101. Id. at 298-99.
102. Id. at 301 (emphasis added) (quoting Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643,
648 (1944)).
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discussion,1 "3 a fair reading of the opinion is that it rests primarily on
effects.1 0
4
The statute at issue in McClung itself, viewed as based upon effects
on commerce, would probably survive Lopez and Morrison. The sale of
food is commercial, so a liberal effects test would apply. °5 However,
any endorsement McClung gives to future regulation of both commer-
cial and noncommercial activities grounded solely on a past border
103. See id, at 304 ("The only remaining question... is whether the particular restaurant
either serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or serves food a substantial portion of
which has moved in interstate commerce.").
104. In passages set forth below the Court describes and evaluates the legislative history
of the Civil Rights Act:
[T]here was an impressive array of testimony that discrimination in restaurants
had a direct and highly restrictive effect upon interstate travel by Negroes. This
resulted, it was said, because discriminatory practices prevent Negroes from buy-
ing prepared food served on the premises while on a trip, except in isolated and
unkempt restaurants and under most unsatisfactory and often unpleasant condi-
tions. This obviously discourages travel and obstructs interstate commerce for
one can hardly travel without eating. Likewise, it was said, that discrimination
deterred professional, as well as skilled, people from moving into areas where
such practices occurred and thereby caused industry to be reluctant to establish
there.
We believe that this testimony afforded ample basis for the conclusion that
established restaurants in such areas sold less interstate goods because of the dis-
crimination, that interstate travel was obstructed directly by it, that business in
general suffered and that many new businesses refrained from establishing there
as a result of it. Hence the District Court was in error in concluding that there
was no connection between discrimination and the movement of interstate com-
merce. The court's conclusion that such a connection is outside "common expe-
rience" flies in the face of stubborn fact.
Id. at 300 (internal citation omitted). The passage quoted above explores the effect of
discrimination generally on interstate commerce. It does not explore any connection be-
tween the prior movement of goods and the effect on interstate commerce, but rather the
effect of discrimination on commerce in the future. Put another way it explores the ten-
dency of discrimination to deter desired border crossings. Indeed it does not mention any
negative effect of the prior crossings themselves. In fact, it does not deal with such cross-
ings at all. The passage continues, for the first time alluding to the crossing element of the
statute:
It goes without saying that, viewed in isolation, the volume of food purchased by
Ollie's Barbecue from sources supplied from out of state was insignificant when
compared with the total foodstuffs moving in commerce. But, as our late Brother
Jackson said for the Court in Wickard v. Filburn: "That appellee's own contribution
to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from
the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together
with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial."
Id. at 300-01 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28
(1942)). But the discussion of the prior movement seems tied to an effects test by the
quotation from Wickard, a case where the Court shifted its focus to the effects on com-
merce of the regulated activity. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
105. McClung, 379 U.S. at 303-04 (stating that only a rational basis is needed to justify
regulation of commerce).
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crossing seems more apparent than real; for the real rationale seems
ultimately dependent on a broad view of federal power to regulate
actions affecting commerce that existed before the decisions in Lopez
and Morrison.10
6
The basis on which Scarborough and McClung most likely permit-
ted regulation of weapons that crossed borders and of restaurants that
used materials that had crossed-the effects test-is now a signifi-
cantly limited justification. Despite some confusing language, both
seem to have really decided that the effects test would so clearly per-
mit the regulation at issue that any lesser and included regulation was
not suspect. Today, when there seems to be a significant set of activi-
ties (i.e., noneconomic activities) that cannot be regulated under the
effects test, it is necessary to carefully rethink and attempt to justify
post-crossing regulation based solely on the prior crossing.
b. Arguments Against Federal Regulation of Activities Based Solely
on Their Connections with Past Border Crossings.-Read carefully, Lopez
itself contains passages that suggest a dependence of the post-crossing
technique on the substantially-affecting technique. Put another way,
some passages in Lopez suggest that jurisdictional elements may not be
independently sufficient justifications, separate and apart from the af-
fecting commerce justification. In striking down the Gun-Free School
Zones Act, the Court said: "[the statute] contains no jurisdictional ele-
ment which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm pos-
session in question affects interstate commerce."1 °7 Similar statements
appear in Morrison."8 Based on these statements, do we conclude that
a jurisdictional element-particularly prior movement in interstate
commerce-is just a proxy for affecting commerce? Or is it an alter-
native and independent method of justifying a law under Congress's
commerce powers? And if it is the latter, does that make analytic
sense?
While the passage just quoted suggests that the crossing tech-
nique is dependent on effect, that reading is filled with analytic
106. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text (describing the broad view of federal
power to regulate actions affecting commerce).
107. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (emphasis added).
108. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000). As the Court stated:
Like the Gun-Free School Zones Act at issue in Lopez, § 13981 contains no juris-
dictional element establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of
Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce. Although Lopez makes clear
that such a jurisdictional element would lend support to the argument that
§ 13981 is sufficiendy tied to interstate commerce, Congress elected to cast
§ 1 3 9 81's remedy over a wider, and more purely intrastate, body of violent crime.
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problems. For example, once something crosses a border, there is no
guarantee, or even an increased probability, that it will continue to
affect interstate commerce. Ultimately it seems likely that the Court
will have to acknowledge this problem. In turn, that will force it to
determine if regulating activities based solely on their connection with
prior border crossings serves any purposes that can plausibly be attrib-
uted to the Commerce Clause. That, in turn, forces the question of
what, if any, federal police powers can be so attributed.
First, it should be clear that a past crossing of a state line has no
necessary correlation with a future effect on interstate commerce. 10 9
Imagine a pistol shipped into Texas finding its way to a small town at
the center of the state. Many years later it is possessed by a felon who,
let us say, does some isolated physical and psychic damage with it.
Perhaps there is a slight effect on commerce by every act of violence
(or of violence with firearms) which, when summed with other similar
instances, is substantial enough to meet the effects test however ad-
justed by Lopez. This seems remote because bare possession will al-
most certainly be classified as a noncommercial activity, which is likely
to be per se excluded from Congress's commerce powers.1 ° Assum-
ing the unlikely-that the effects test is met-the border crossing
adds nothing of any significance. The Court's post-Lopez effects test
has been met: the pistol could have been regulated even if it had been
made in Texas, by Texans from Texas materials and had never left
and reentered the state.
109. As this Article was prepared for press, a single Federal District Court reached simi-
lar conclusions as to some of the arguments about the compatibility of Lopez with a broad
border crossing justification for regulating interstate commerce. United States v. Coward,
151 F. Supp. 2d 544, 554 (E.D. Pa. 2001). For the differences and similarities of my analysis
with Coward, see infra note 157 and accompanying text. I suppose that in light of Lopez's
facts it should not be surprising that the one federal court opinion to consider these issues
should employ a similar gun-based hypothetical:
Thus, a felon who has always kept his father's World War II trophy Luger in
his bedroom has the weapon "in" commerce. The question now is whether this
legal fiction can survive as a statutory construct in the shadow of the edifice the
Supreme Court has built upon Lopez's foundation.
Coward, 151 F. Supp. 2d at 549.
110. This seems to be the whole basis of the Court's summary rejection of Commerce
Clause justifications offered by the government in Lopez
The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity
that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate
commerce. Respondent was a local student at a local school; there is no indica-
tion that he had recently moved in interstate commerce, and there is no require-
ment that his possession of the firearm have any concrete tie to interstate
commerce.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
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Suppose instead, as is more likely, that none of the above is true.
Perhaps, there is no effect on interstate commerce. Perhaps there is a
small effect, which when summed together with other similar transac-
tions, still fails to meet the Lopez substantiality test."1  More likely, the
matter regulated is deemed noncommercial and the Court follows its
leanings, expressed particularly in Morrison, by holding that noncom-
mercial status flatly precludes federal regulation. 12 In other words,
let us assume that the effect of the thing on interstate commerce is
not sufficient to justify regulation without regard to its history of bor-
der crossing. How does the fact that the pistol once crossed a border
sufficiently create or amplify an effect? Generally, it does not do this
at all. Consequently, to understand and appraise the appeal of border
crossings as a justification for regulating goods, one must identify a
regulatory goal fairly attributable to the Commerce Clause that makes
sense independent of the substantial effects test.
Some have read the cases that deal with the scope of Congress's
Commerce Clause power to prohibit the interstate transit of goods as
indicating that Congress has the power to do so to prevent "pollution"
of interstate commerce. 13 The majority in Champion v. Ames uses
these words.' 14 Hammer v. Dagenhart might be read this way.' t5 For
the reasons stated below, however, I do not believe that either case
intended the full implications of this characterization.
111. See id. at 558-59 (concluding that Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause
includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial effect on interstate
commerce).
112. See supra notes 25-42 and accompanying text (discussing the near certainty that
Lopez and Morrison together wholly exclude a class of noneconomic activities from the pos-
sibility of justifiable federal regulation).
113. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) (finding unconstitutional a fed-
eral statute that prohibited shipment of certain goods made by child labor through inter-
state commerce); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 327 (1903) (upholding a federal
statute prohibiting the passage of certain lottery tickets through interstate commerce).
114. The Champion majority stated:
If a State, when considering legislation for the suppression of lotteries within
its own limits, may properly take into view the evils that inhere in the raising of
money, in that mode, why may not Congress, invested with the power to regulate
commerce among the several States, provide that such commerce shall not be
polluted by the carrying of lottery tickets from one State to another?
Champion, 188 U.S. at 356 (emphasis added).
115. Taking advantage of the statements in Champion, while arguing in favor of child
labor laws in Hammer, the United States Solicitor General stated:
The act also protects the health of children in the producing State. The
Fifth Amendment imposes no obstacle to the denial by Congress of facilities of
interstate transit for the prevention of injury to children in the shipping State.
Congress can outlaw such goods to prevent pollution of the interstate stream.
Hammer, 247 U.S. at 257 (emphasis added).
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The Hammer majority stressed that all of the things prohibited
from interstate commerce under previously upheld laws were inher-
ently harmful, such as lottery tickets, adulterated food, and people
intended to engage in immoral sexual activity.1 16 Thus they distin-
guished the child labor law at issue, which in their view prohibited not
an inherently dangerous or corrupting thing, but rather a thing whose
prohibition was based on its production history.1 17
Surely the Hammer majority recognized the following problem. If
interstate commerce were a place, a lake or a mountain range, prohib-
iting "pollution" of interstate commerce would have a natural mean-
ing. But interstate commerce is not a place. Certainly it is not the
sum of the infinitely thin spaces over state boundary lines. As a result,
I do not believe that the Court viewed congressional authority as the
authority to prevent the pollution of commerce. Rather, I believe the
Court viewed congressional authority as the authority to prevent pol-
lution by commerce:
In each of these instances the use of interstate transportation
was necessary to the accomplishment of harmful results. In
other words, although the power over interstate transporta-
tion was to regulate, that could only be accomplished by
prohibiting the use of the facilities of interstate commerce to effect
the evil intended.'" 8
Surely they intended their formula to go beyond harm to instrumen-
talities and channels of interstate commerce or to people and things
using them. Examples of these would be bombs in trains or train sta-
tions, or using pollution more metaphorically, gambling in either a
train or a train station.
Most of the harm contemplated by the Hammer majority as within
Congress's reach occurs after the goods come to rest in a state. 19 The
notion seems to be that Congress has a valid regulatory role in stop-
ping interstate commerce from polluting the states, not just literally a
role in prohibiting pollution of interstate commerce itself. But does
regulation of this sort simply mean that Congress can regulate any-
thing that threatens a federally defined "good," implying the existence
116. Id. at 270-71. The Court discussed three cases to support this proposition: Cham-
pion, 188 U.S. 321; Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (sustaining Con-
gressional regulation of impure foods and drugs); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308
(1913) (upholding federal regulation of the transportation of women for the purpose of
prostitution).
117. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 271-72.
118. Id. at 271 (emphasis added).
119. See id at 271-74 (noting that the production of articles destined for interstate com-
merce is in itself innocuous).
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of a federal police power? Or does it mean regulation of things that
states have independently determined to be negative?
The latter view presents many difficulties and it has never been
the Court's view that Congress's Commerce Clause powers (as op-
posed to the farthest reaches of the Spending Clause powers) depend
on state consent.' 20 The former view of independent congressional
power to define police protections for states from harmful commerce
would provide an intelligible, as opposed to formalistic, rationale for
the position taken in the prohibition cases. This is seen in Supreme
Court cases, particularly United States v. Darby, holding that Congress
has the power under the Commerce Clause to stop anything from
crossing a state border. 12 1
This idea might also find support in an argument that Congress
can condition its allowing anything to cross a border on its retaining
at least substantial regulatory power over the item and transactions
involving it after it crosses. Arguably this is demonstrated in weapons
possession cases, such as Scarborough, and in McClung, although, above
I have shown that a narrower reading of these cases is plausible.1 22
Put another way, the view under discussion is that Congress's reg-
ulatory power includes power to insure that interstate commerce not
become a delivery system for harm, however Congress defines harm, any-
where in the United States. Given this view of what it is to regulate
commerce, the chronological problem perhaps disappears, or at least
changes. The focus is not solely on what happens after a border cross-
ing, but also on the fact that a border crossing enabled it to happen.
In other words, when Congress views items as generally harmful, it can
stop them from crossing borders.1 2 1 When it views items as innocent
in a wide variety of, but not all, circumstances, it can allow them to
120. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941) (noting that Congress's power
over interstate commerce "can neither be enlarged nor diminished by the exercise or non-
exercise of state power"). State consent, however, is crucial to the operation of many of
Congress's powers under the Spending Clause. There are many state regulatory and en-
forcement outcomes beyond Congress's power to compel, but within its power to achieve
by purchasing compliance from willing states. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-
07, 210-13 (1987) (allowing Congress to condition a federal highway funds grant to the
states on a state's passage of a minimum drinking age without regard to whether Congress
itself could have passed such a law under the Commerce Clause).
121. Dary, 312 U.S. at 114.
122. See supra notes 93-106 and accompanying text (discussing possible readings of Scar-
borough and McClung).
123. See Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1911) (prohibiting misla-
beled food from crossing state borders); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 363 (1903)
(prohibiting lottery tickets from crossing state borders).
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cross borders while forbidding future harmful use.' 2 4 This view of
Congress's regulatory powers, while disputable and troubling, makes
sense of cases such as United States v. Sorrentino.1 25 However, it is in
tension with language in Lopez' 26 and in great tension with the Lopez
majority's object of creating meaningful and exclusive regulatory
space for states.
12 7
There are two ways of attacking such regulation. The first and
more difficult one would be to successfully attack earlier cases appar-
ently holding that Congress's Commerce Clause powers give it com-
plete power to stop anything from crossing a state border as long as
the prohibition does not offend some specific provision of the Consti-
tution, such as the equal protection component of the Fifth Amend-
ment 128 or the First Amendment.1 29 On this view, a prohibition itself
124. See Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 566-67 (1977) (upholding congres-
sional power to regulate gun possession under the Commerce Clause arguably on the basis
that the gun previously traveled in interstate commerce); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294, 304 (1964) (prohibiting racial discrimination by restaurants that served food that had
previously crossed state borders).
125. 72 F.3d 294 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding a gun possession law as a legitimate exercise
of congressional power when the law requires that the gun have traveled in interstate
commerce).
126. It is not clear that regulation of goods after they have crossed state lines is within
Lopez's description of Congress's interstate commerce power:
[W] e have identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate
under its commerce power. First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels
of interstate commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce, even though the thread may come only from intrastate activities. Fi-
nally, Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activi-
ties having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (internal citations omitted).
127. In Morrison, the Court explained:
[T]he concern . . . expressed in Lopez that Congress might use the Commerce
Clause to completely obliterate the Constitution's distinction between national
and local authority seems well founded. The reasoning that petitioners advance
seeks to follow the but-for causal chain. . . to every attenuated effect upon inter-
state commerce. [Their] reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any crime
as long as [its] nationwide, aggregated impact ... has substantial effects on em-
ployment, production, transit, or consumption ....
[Their] reasoning ... will not limit Congress to regulating violence but may
... be applied equally.., to family law and other areas of traditional state regula-
tion since the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the na-
tional economy is undoubtedly significant.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-16 (2000) (internal citation omitted).
128. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). In Boiling, the Court found in the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause a requirement similar to that of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. As a consequence, wholly irrational dis-
tinctions between what can and cannot cross borders would be unconstitutional:
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would have to be a reasonable way of furthering Commerce Clause
values in order to be valid. t3° If this revisionist view were accepted,
Congress would not have complete freedom to condition its allowance
of any border crossing on its continuing to have power in the future to
regulate that which crossed. Put another way, Congress cannot
charge a price-maintaining a post-crossing regulatory power-to
forgo a prohibition that it had no power to impose in the first place.
These are interesting and difficult arguments. They are interest-
ing because they would require some theory about the permissible
ends of regulation under the Commerce Clause that could be used to
sustain a regulation that is a rational means to those ends. Could one
plausibly argue that the only such end is to promote the flow of trade
between states? On this view, Congress could prohibit shipment
across state lines only if the transportation of the goods or the goods
themselves pose a threat to interstate commerce by virtue of shipment or
after shipment. Or is another permissible end of regulation under
the Commerce Clause protecting the states from local harms that the
states themselves are disabled from fully regulating as a result of limi-
tations on state regulation of interstate commerce-limitations such
as the restrictions of the "dormant Commerce Clause,"' 31 Privileges
and Immunities Clause,13 2 and the Equal Protection Clause? 3 ' This
view is particularly interesting because, under it, the Commerce
Clause would be about more than regulating commerce and would
include a federal police power aimed at making up for state disabili-
ties under federalism. Under this view, federal power to prohibit
transportation of certain goods may permit Congress to exercise po-
lice power for states that are disabled from stopping their entry.
There are great difficulties with such a direct attack on plenary
congressional power to halt commerce of any sort at state borders.
It is by now well established that legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and
benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutional-
ity, and that the burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to estab-
lish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.
Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 637 (1993)
(quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)).
129. See Kingsley Int'l Pictures v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688-90 (1959) (finding that a
law regulating motion pictures, directly or indirectly based on their content, would be
unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
130. See supra note 128.
131. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce Clause as imposing an implicit
restraint on state power, even when Congress has not acted. 1 TPIBE, supra note 5, at 1030.
132. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. I ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
133. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
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First, a number of cases oppose such an attack. Darby seems a clear
holding that such congressional power exists.34 It follows Justice
Holmes's generally praised opinion in Hammer, which, in turn, is very
likely based on Justice John Marshall's views.135 Beyond this, there are
great problems in sensibly working out the limits of a federal police
power to occupy areas of state impotence under federalism.
These controversial arguments are for another article.1 36 It is not
necessary to attack the plenary view of Congress's powers to prohibit
interstate transportation in order to argue against the validity of many
laws which permit such transportation on the condition that Congress
regulate the aftermath of the border crossing, as was arguably done in
McClung and Sorrentino.1 37 In many cases, such regulation is the prod-
uct of an unconstitutional condition or something very much like it.
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that a government
that is free to grant benefits is not always free to grant them in ex-
change for a waiver of a constitutional right. 13  One can waive one's
134. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (upholding congressional regula-
tions of commerce, no matter what the motive or purpose, that do not infringe upon a
constitutional prohibition).
135. See id. at 115-16 (citing Justice Holmes's dissent in Hammer).
136. In spite of arguments that the Constitutional Convention rejected such an ap-
proach, one author indorses it:
The kernel of my positive suggestion is so obvious that I would be embar-
rassed to offer it, if it did not seem necessary that someone should: when we are
trying to decide whether some federal law or program can be justified under the
commerce power, we should ask ourselves the question, "Is there some reason the
federal government must be able to do this, some reason why we cannot leave the
matter to the states?" Federal power exists where and only where there is special
justification for it ....
Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 555 (1995).
The argument to the contrary is that the Constitutional Convention ultimately re-
jected substitute language that would have covered the same area as the Commerce Clause
and probably much more:
That the National Legislature ought to possess the Legislative Rights vested in
Congress by the Confederation; and moreover, to legislate in all cases for the
general interests of the union, and also in those to which the States are separately
incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted
by the exercise of individual Legislation.
Id. at 555-56 (quoting JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 380 (W.W. Norton & Co. ed., 1966)). Regan believes that rejection of this lan-
guage is not inconsistent with reading its spirit into the existing Commerce Clause. Id. at
556. Of course the opposite conclusion easily could be drawn.
137. See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text (discussing McClung and Sorrentino).
138. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1415, 1415
(1989). As Professor Sullivan explains:
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that government may not
grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional
right, even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether. It reflects the
208
2002] THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BORDER CROSSINGS 209
right to a trial in exchange for a relatively light sentence, but not
one's right to general freedom of political speech in exchange for a
government grant.139 The doctrine is not clear and mechanical, yet it
is necessary to preserve balanced constitutional power. 4 The issue is
whether the condition is a reasonable way for the government to exer-
cise the power granted or is, instead, a way of using one granted
power as a lever for expanding other powers not fairly contemplated
by the Constitution. Plea bargains-conditioning a lighter sentence
than might be obtained after trial on a waiver of constitutional rights
to assert innocence-are constitutional."' This is presumably be-
cause they are necessary for the criminal process to work and are not
seen as unduly coercive.1 42 Using governmental wealth to buy citi-
zens' silence on political matters is unconstitutional. 43 It allows the
taxing power144 to prop up a government that perpetuates itself
through elimination of criticism.
triumph of the view that government may not do indirectly what it may not do
directly over the view that the greater power to deny a benefit includes the lesser
power to impose a condition on its receipt.
Id In border crossing cases, the benefit would be congressional permission for things to
cross the border. Stated better, it would be Congress's refraining from exercising the con-
gressional power, recognized since Darby, to prohibit the passage of anything across state
lines unless the prohibition violates some separate provision of the Constitution, such as
the First Amendment (for prohibiting the shipping of ordinary books and newspapers) or
the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment (absolutely senseless congres-
sional distinctions concerning what can and cannot cross). The benefit withheld would be
granted only for a waiver of what would otherwise be restrictions on regulation under the
Commerce Clause; specifically the restriction on regulating something not otherwise fall-
ing into the categories of permissible regulation such as regulation of those things that
substantially affect interstate commerce.
139. See id at 1423 (noting that the government cannot condition a constitutional guar-
antee on a government benefit).
140. See id. at 1419 ("[The unconstitutional conditions doctrine] identifies a characteris-
tic technique by which government appears not to, but in fact does burden . . . liberties,
triggering a demand for especially strong justification by the statute.").
141. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 (1984) (stating that plea bargains do not
deprive one of constitutional rights).
142. See 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.1 (1999).
143. As Professor Sullivan has stated:
The view that government must treat speakers evenhandedly underlies the
Court's consistent statements in unconstitutional conditions challenges that ben-
efit conditions predicated on viewpoint discrimination are void: government may
not "'"ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas"'" by buying them out any
more than by punishing them.
Sullivan, supra note 138, at 1496 (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S.
540, 548 (1983) (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (quoting
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958)))).
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I ("The Congress shall have the Power to lay and collect
Taxes ... to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general welfare of
the United States . . ").
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Even if Congress has the power to prohibit anything from cross-
ing a state line (subject to the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amend-
ment), its purporting to forego the exercise of that power in exchange
for powers to regulate related post-crossing transactions raises ques-
tions akin to those posed under the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine. There are differences. Here there is no deal to scrutinize for
coercion. States are not asked to consent to federal assumption of
regulatory powers over transactions in exchange for Congress's re-
straint in not prohibiting interstate traffic leading up to such transac-
tions. But, if anything, this difference counsels more skepticism than
under the doctrine as it usually applies. And the similarities are strik-
ing. In both cases more is at stake than the interests of those con-
senting. Even if the speaker finds it a fair deal to bargain his speech
away for federal money, we do not want to live in a world in which the
federal government has the power to stop people from speaking to us.
States do not want to live in a world in which a power to stop goods
from crossing state borders, although unexercised and often politi-
cally unexercisable, can be transmuted into one to regulate transac-
tions that do not continue to have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.
One important feature of constitutional law worth observing is
how doctrine uses natural features of the world and legal rules to-
gether to limit governmental power. Even if Congress can stop virtu-
ally everything from crossing state lines, in the real world this power is
subject to great practical and political limitations. The latter limita-
tions could easily be evaded if bluffing the use of such power can be
used as a lever to extend the scope of Congress's regulatory powers. It
is not likely that the gun at issue in Sorrentino would be denied entry
into interstate commerce. It is nearly unimaginable that the food at
issue in McClung would have been excluded. Congress would have to
have performed the impossible task of predicting which guns would
be possessed by felons and which food would be used by racially dis-
criminatory establishments and then ban only those guns and that
food. The only possible choice was politically impractical: banning all
interstate transportation of guns or food. To base Congress's power
to regulate in Sorrentino or McClung on a power to stop transportation
that clearly would not have been exercised is to so expand that power
as to transmute it into a qualitatively different power.
The notion of limited federal government as expressed in Lopez
and Morrison145 is inconsistent with a prohibition technique that can
145. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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be so freely transmuted into a much more potent power than prohibi-
tion-style regulation itself. Had the law struck down in Lopez prohib-
ited the possession, within one thousand feet of a school, of any
weapon all or any part of which had moved in interstate commerce,
the law would have been nearly coextensive with the one actually
struck. But it would have had strong claims to constitutionality under
both Sorrentino and a surface reading of the Supreme Court cases it
cites dealing with border crossings.146 Had the law rebutably, or con-
clusively, presumed that any weapon had so moved, it would have ap-
proached or achieved functional identity with the law struck down in
Lopez, and yet would seem more likely than not to be constitutional
under techniques approved by the Supreme Court starting in the late
1930s and not repudiated by Lopez.147 Indeed, these techniques can
be made to fit within the vague "channels and instrumentalities" regu-
lation approved by Lopez as justifying regulation independently of any
effect on commerce.14 It is hard to imagine that the Lopez-Morrison
majority would tolerate this.
The hypothetical discussed above looks tame in comparison with
those that might be based on Katzenburg v. McClung.4 ' That case, in
some ways though not in others, seems to go farther than Scarborough
and Sorrentino. It appears to allow regulation not simply of the use
and immediate circumstances of the previously moved material but
also of other aspects of activities of entities that have made use of the
previously moved material. Some passages in McClung suggest that,
under its commerce powers, Congress can penalize discrimination
against customers of a restaurant based solely on the fact that a sub-
stantial amount of the goods it served moved in interstate com-
merce. 5 ' Pushed as far as it might go, McClungwould allow Congress
to impose police power regulation over any business, entity, or person,
146. See United States v. Sorrentino, 72 F.3d 294, 296-97 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that,
unlike Lopez, the statute at issue in Sorrentino contained the element of previous travel in
interstate commerce).
147. See supra Part II.A; see also Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156-57 (1971) (al-
lowing federal regulation of loan sharking because loan sharking, while predominantly an
intrastate activity, is part of a class of activities that substantially affects interstate
commerce).
148. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (affirming that Congress has the
power to regulate channels and instrumentalities of commerce).
149. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). For a discussion of McClung, see supra notes 88-90, 100-106
and accompanying text.
150. See McClung, 379 U.S. at 302 ("We think . . . that Congress acted well within its
power to protect and foster commerce in extending the coverage of Title 1I only to those
restaurants offering to serve interstate travelers or serving food, a substantial portion of
which has moved in interstate commerce.").
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sustained to the requisite degree by interstate commerce. Intuitively it
is obvious that the Lopez-Morrison majority would not allow federal
power to reach so far. But if McClung is grounded on the border
crossing justification, 1 ' then the Court must either abandon it or en-
gage in a difficult process of line-drawing in order to be true to Lopez's
states' rights philosophy. Where will the Court draw the line on a
continuum between a federal prohibition of discrimination at restau-
rants and a federal criminal code that applies to those who eat regu-
larly at McDonalds?
The Court may reject the technique entirely, by claiming (as I
suggest above) that Scarborough and McClung never clearly endorsed
future regulation based solely on a past crossing 5 2 or by overruling
them, if it reads them that broadly. More likely, the Court will retain
the technique while limiting the circumstances in which such a cross-
ing can be used to gain future regulatory control.
One possibility is adaptation of the economic/noneconomic dis-
tinction for use in limiting this technique as well as the affecting com-
merce technique. Perhaps the Court will allow a border crossing to
support regulation of future economic activity bound up with it, but
not regulation of future noneconomic activity.' 53 Such a view would
allow regulation of a commercial establishment on the basis of the
border crossing in a case resembling McClung, but not of all crimes of
violence committed with a weapon that once crossed state lines. That
view might even more easily dispatch the extreme examples presented
above. However, even as to them, more limitation might be necessary.
It seems probable that none of the Justices would allow federal regula-
tion of all aspects of economic life of persons simply because the peo-
ple have crossed state lines or sustained themselves with articles of
commerce. Perhaps the Court will resort to use of the unsatisfying
direct and indirect distinction,'54 allowing regulation of all activities
directly or substantially supported by a border crossing. Perhaps in-
stead the Court will require each single statute based on border cross-
ings to regulate distinct and homogeneous sorts of economic activity,
although such limits would be avoidable by writing a series of statutes.
151. But see supra notes 100-106 and accompanying text (discussing the strong argu-
ments in favor of McClung's grounding on the affecting commerce justification rather than
one based on a border crossing).
152. See supra notes 92-106 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 19-42 and accompanying text (discussing Lopez's and Morrison's al-
most certain limitation of the affecting commerce justification to regulation of "economic
activity").
154. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895) (authorizing con-
gressional regulation of only those activities having a direct effect on commerce).
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These all seem like mindless limits. The real question is why,
given the Court's general views of federalism, do prior border cross-
ings, which do not have aggregate substantial future effects on inter-
state commerce, warrant future regulation, even of noneconomic
activities?
Symbolism of a balanced federalism might be an answer, but this
is circular: identifying the correct balance is precisely the issue. Fram-
ers' intent might be another answer, but it does not seem adequate to
make a case for post-crossing regulation. As discussed above, it is pos-
sible that the Constitution contemplated congressional power to con-
trol the passage of anything through interstate commerce.' 5 5 This is
one plausible meaning of regulation of interstate commerce, and, in
practical terms, giving Congress broad powers to prohibit transit
across borders poses a limited threat to federalism, even as the Lopez-
Morrison majority defines it.
It is, however, a huge step from congressional power to stop the
transit of specified things across state lines to power to control things
and people who have previously crossed. To look at one of many in-
fluences on interpretation, it seems unlikely that the Framers would
have been anything but appalled at a system that potentially federal-
izes all things, and the transactions that they touch, solely on such
grounds." 6 If some form of balanced federalism survives today, it
seems incompatible with a post-crossing technique.' 5 7 The latter is
legalism unconnected with rational policy.
155. See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
156. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 545-
46 (1969) (describing the emerging view of federalism in the late 1700s as one where "both
the state and federal legislatures were equally representative of the people at the same
time").
157. As this Article went to press, a Federal District Court narrowly construed a federal
law regulating the interstate shipment, possession, and use of firearms by felons not to
apply to cases in which the sole connection with interstate commerce was prior interstate
shipment. United States v. Coward, 151 F. Supp. 2d 544, 554 (E.D. Pa. 2001). It so con-
strued the law in order to avoid what it saw as the serious likelihood that a law supported
solely by such a connection would exceed Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause.
Id. In doing so, the Court parted company with cases in other circuits that had found prior
interstate shipment of a firearm a sufficient connection with interstate commerce to war-
rant a federal criminal prohibition of its possession by felons. See, e.g., United States v.
Sorrentino, 72 F.3d 294, 296 (2d Cir. 1995) (concluding that a border crossing is sufficient
to justify regulation and citing cases in other circuits doing so as well). For other federal
cases finding prior interstate passage a sufficient basis for regulation, see supra note 86.
The Constitution-based arguments for narrow construction in Coward are significantly
different from the argument in this Article. First, the Coward court takes seriously sugges-
tions in some opinions that passage through interstate commerce may guarantee a contin-
uing effect on interstate commerce and correctly denounces any such view as an
indefensible legal fiction. Coward, 151 F. Supp. at 554. While agreeing with that position,
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CONCLUSION
The use of jurisdictional elements-particularly border cross-
ings-as independent and sufficient grounds for regulation under the
Commerce Clause can be seen in two ways. If not based on some
theory of federal police power, allowing Congress to determine what
are and are not acceptable results of border crossings causally far
downstream, it has the quality of formalism or "gotcha"jurisprudence,
connected to no policy that is in turn remotely related to a believable
purpose of the Commerce Clause. But, if based on a far-reaching
power to define ill effects and regulate any of those effects resulting
from the use of commerce, the tension with Lopez and Morrison's phi-
losophy of federalism is unbearable.
Scarborough, as understood in Sorrentino, is unsatisfying and, per-
haps, dishonest. In an economically unified nation, the federal gov-
ernment must be able to regulate anything that affects interstate
commerce, at least if it does so substantially. Lopez, with its new fuzzy
enclaves for noncommercial activity, undermines that necessity. Pre-
sumably the Framers, in abandoning the Articles of Confederation,
wanted federal regulation of national economic problems.15 8 But, at
the time, that result was compatible with at least presumptive enclaves
for most productive activity because the economy was predominately
local.159 Additionally, they lived in a world in which it would have
been unthinkable to analyze all aspects of life in terms resembling
this Article goes on to recognize, discuss, and reject another argument that might be of-
fered in favor of the border crossing justification. It is that Congress may have the power
to condition passage across state lines on continued federal and regulatory power over that
which passes. See supra notes 136-151 and accompanying text. Second, while I ultimately
agree with the Coward court that prior shipment by itself is a constitutionally insufficient
ground for regulation and that it is inconsistent with the spirit of the Lopez line of cases, I
reach a different conclusion as to the scope of Congress's regulatory powers under the
Commerce Clause based on an activity's effect on interstate commerce. The Coward court
embraced Lopez's new limits on regulation of activities based on their effect on interstate
commerce. Coward, 151 F. Supp. 2d at 551-54. I disagree with this. I believe that Lopez is
too restrictive and that the invalidity of the prior shipment as a ground for regulation is not
dependent on accepting the Court's position in Lopez. I would allow the regulation of
activities that seem on the surface to be noneconomic in Lopez's sense, but which have a
reasonably demonstrable substantial effect on interstate commerce. This argument is dis-
cussed in the conclusion to this Article.
158. See RUTLEDGE, supra note 56, at 25-26; see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 313 (1993) ("Even at the outset of the Revolution some Ameri-
cans glimpsed the significance of buying and selling among themselves, which in turn had
contributed to the reform of the Articles of Confederation and the creation of a more
unified country.").
159. See WOOD, supra note 158, at 311-12 (describing the economy in the early American
republic as primarily local and agricultural). It is worth noting that even in the early 1800s
the American economy was rapidly growing and becoming more unified. See id. at 312-16.
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those of market economics. Today, influenced by reductionist eco-
nomic theories, it is harder to avoid seeing (often while trying to sup-
press) an economic analysis of all aspects of life-even those involving
friendship, family, and other relationships. 160
I believe that, politically or psychologically, the jurisdictional ele-
ment rationales survive, to the extent that they do, as the product of
an uneasy truce, allowing some federal enclaves in the world rear-
ranged by Lopez to protect the states in areas that are hard to define.
By this compromise, the unsettling of federalism is ameliorated (and
much federal power is retained) in cases where it should be, but only
because the techniques have been used in a relatively restrained way
and happen to overlap with regulation that should be, but no longer
is, sustainable on an affecting commerce theory. Should the federal
government be able to regulate fraud or kidnapping because of a sin-
gle telephone call over what are inevitably interstate telephone lines?
No. It should be able to regulate fraud because of the collective effect
of fraud and kidnapping on the economy, and perhaps where state
lines have been crossed after the crime.
It would be more honest, and in other ways better, to abandon
talismanic border crossings as justifications for the future regulation
of that which crosses and restore a more flexible view of Congress's
power to regulate matters that, in the aggregate, affect commerce.
One limited way would be for the Court to abandon what is appar-
ently its current trajectory and take the position that noncommercial
activities occupy no absolute enclaves, but simply require, for their
regulation, that Congress make a stronger case demonstrating sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce. Better still would be not to
shift the burden at all, but to restore the Commerce Clause test as a
160. This presents what some might see as the irony of the economic/noneconomic
distinction drawn by conservative Justices in Lopez being somewhat undermined by a largely
conservative economic movement. The more likely reading of Lopez is that there exists a
category of noneconomic activity that is beyond Congress's regulatory powers under the
Commerce Clause even if such activities substantially affect interstate commerce. See supra
notes 29-42 and accompanying text. This is in tension with recent writings in economics
and "law and economics" that tend to view all activities as economic in the sense that they
are driven by market-like forces. As Professor James White has summarized:
It is hard to exaggerate the magnitude of the claims that have been made for
economics .... Gary Becker says that in his view "the economic approach pro-
vides a united framework for understanding behavior that has long been sought
by and eluded Bentham, Comte, Marx, and others." Judge Easterbrook says that
economics is applied rationality." Or take this remark by George J. Stigler: "All
of man's deliberative, forward-looking behavior follows the principles of
economics."
James Boyd White, Economics and Law: Two Cultures in Tension, 54 TENN. L. REv. 161, 172
n.8 (1986) (internal citations omitted).
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rational basis test, but perhaps one with real bite. Once one recog-
nizes that the regulation of commerce is regulation of that which af-
fects it, early Marshall Court opinions, and indeed by analogy
opinions of the Rehnquist Court, suggest that the Court must greatly
defer to Congress.
Where this is not true should be in those areas, if any, in which
the independence of the states might suggest the importance of state
diversity notwithstanding costs to the national economy. Perhaps edu-
cation and marriage, concerns of the Lapez Court, 161 are such areas in
which federal regulation under the Commerce Clause (as opposed to
human rights regulation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment) ought to be backed by substantiality and necessity as opposed
to a rational basis. This has the virtue of avoiding the contradiction of
calling something noncommercial even though it substantially affects
commerce. However, it would leave the Court with the very difficult
task of justifying this view of federalism on grounds plausibly con-
nected with either the Tenth Amendment or the original structure
and understanding of the Constitution.
I am not one who believes that an attempt to hold a seance with
the Framers is the first step in Constitutional interpretation; although,
I do believe that we are lost and unmoored if constitutional law can-
not be connected in some reasonable way with the text of the Consti-
tution or with unstated assumptions that were part of the original
understanding. Certainly the Framers never imagined that almost
everything would be of legitimate federal regulatory concern, but
then it is certain that they never imagined their Constitution function-
ing in a world like today's tightly connected economic world. Perhaps
less so than texts requiring "due process," but to some significant ex-
tent, text granting Congress the power "to regulate commerce among
the several states" is sufficiently flexible, linguistically, to adapt to our
world. As for the intent of the Framers, for what it is worth, my guess
is that today they would somewhat sadly live with the pre-Lopez effects
test and perhaps even more easily with a Lopez that presumes against,
but does not categorically exclude regulation of things that appear on
the surface to be "noneconomic." But Scarborough, as explicated in
Sorrentino, would have appalled them.
161. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
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